Recent confrontations involving the Philippines are increasingly seen as indicators of China’s strategy to assert administrative control over the South China Sea, rather than simply claiming territory. This shift is highlighted by incidents such as the interception of Philippine vessels near Second Thomas Shoal.
Escalating Incidents in Disputed Waters
On 24 September 2025, Chinese Coast Guard patrol ships intercepted Philippine vessels undertaking a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal. This shoal is located within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), approximately 60 nautical miles from the BRP Sierra Madre, a ship grounded by Manila in 1999 to assert its claim and serve as a garrison. The Philippine Coast Guard reported that the manoeuvres used by the Chinese vessels, supported by a maritime militia and three nearby warships, ‘put Filipino personnel at risk’.
China’s state-run Global Times, citing an unnamed source, stated that the resupply mission was illegal due to a lack of prior Chinese approval. Similarly, China News quoted China Coast Guard spokesperson Jiang Lue asserting that the Philippines had ‘broken its commitments’. However, Manila has consistently denied any provisional agreement made in 2024 mandates such approvals. This incident follows another aggressive tactic: footage circulated showed a Chinese cutter ramming a Philippine fisheries vessel on 18 September, as reported by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in its analysis.
China’s Administrative Ambitions
China’s actions reflect a deliberate strategy to establish a long-term governance regime in the South China Sea, moving beyond mere territorial claims. This approach is underpinned by China’s ‘nine-dash line’, which it uses cartographically to assert jurisdiction over much of the sea, despite international legal challenges.
An example of this strategy is seen at Scarborough Shoal, where China declared straight baselines in November 2024, followed by the announcement of a national nature reserve in September 2025. Management rules issued in August 2026 prohibited fishing ‘without prior approval’, effectively barring entry to anyone not permitted by Chinese law. This ‘permission regime’ is extended across the South China Sea, with an annual fishing moratorium from May to mid-August affecting areas that overlap with the internationally recognised EEZs of Vietnam and the Philippines. China has also established Sansha City to administer the Paracel and Spratly Islands as Chinese districts.
Further legislative measures include the 2021 Coast Guard Law, which authorises the use of weapons in ‘maritime areas under Chinese jurisdiction’ without clearly defining their extent, and a 2024 Coast Guard Regulation permitting the detention of non-Chinese nationals suspected of illegal entry for up to 60 days. These measures, while not explicitly defining ownership, clearly dictate permission requirements and consequences for non-compliance, cumulatively projecting China’s vision of authority, as detailed by RUSI.
International Legal Rebuttal
A significant legal challenge to China’s stance came from a 2016 arbitral award in the Philippines v China case. This tribunal found that China’s historic rights claims within the nine-dash line were unfounded under international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It also ruled that no maritime feature occupied by China in the Spratly Islands should host its own EEZ, confirming that Second Thomas Shoal exists within the Philippines’ EEZ. While this ruling provided Manila with a strong legal basis to challenge Beijing’s expansion, it has had little practical effect on China’s actions.
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